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INTRODUCTION 
In discussions of state surveillance, the values of privacy and 
security are often set against one another, and people often ask whether 
privacy is more important than national security.1 I will argue that in one 
sense privacy is more important than national security. Just what more 
important means is its own question, though, so I will be more precise. I 
will argue that national security rationales cannot by themselves justify 
some kinds of encroachments on individual privacy (including some 
kinds that the United States has conducted). Specifically, I turn my 
attention to a recent, well publicized, and recently amended statute 
(Section 215 of the USA Patriot Act2), a surveillance program based on 
                                                     
  Alan Rubel is an associate professor at the Information School and in the Legal Studies Program 
at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. This paper is based on a presentation at the Wisconsin 
International Law Journal‘s 2016 Symposium. I wish to thank the participants in that meeting for 
their insightful commentary and discussion.  
 1 Among the key questions that the journal editors ask in motivating their 2016 symposium is 
whether privacy is more important than national security. They explained that ―[d]ata retention, 
surveillance, and similar laws are continuously challenged on the ground that they infringe upon 
individuals‘ privacy. In some countries, such as the United States, the needs of law enforcement 
often outweigh individual privacy, allowing for agencies like the NSA to surveil U.S. citizens.‖ 
WIS. INT‘L L.J. ANN. SYMP., 2016 (Apr. 8, 2016), https://law.wisc.edu/wilj/. 
 2 USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 215, 115 Stat. 272, 286–87 (2001) (codified as 
amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1861). 
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that statute (the National Security Agency‘s bulk metadata collection 
program), and a recent change to that statute that addresses some of the 
public controversy surrounding the surveillance program (the USA 
Freedom Act).3 That process (a statute enabling surveillance, a program 
abiding by that statute, a public controversy, and a change in the law) 
looks like a paradigm case of law working as it should; but I am not so 
sure. While the program was plausibly legal, I will argue that it was 
morally and legally unjustifiable. Specifically, I will argue that the 
interpretations of Section 215 that supported the program violate what 
Jeremy Waldron calls ―legal archetypes,‖4 and that changes to the law 
illustrate one of the central features of legal archetypes and violation of 
legal archetypes. 
The paper proceeds as follows: I begin in Part I by setting out 
what I call the ―basic argument‖ in favor of surveillance programs. This 
is strictly a moral argument about the conditions under which 
surveillance in the service of national security can be justified. In Part II, 
I turn to Section 215 and the bulk metadata surveillance program based 
on that section. I will argue that the program was plausibly legal, though 
based on an aggressive, envelope-pushing interpretation of the statute. I 
conclude Part II by describing the USA Freedom Act, which amends 
Section 215 in important ways. In Part III, I change tack. Rather than 
offering an argument for the conditions under which surveillance is 
justified (as in Part I), I use the discussion of the legal interpretations 
underlying the metadata program to describe a key ambiguity in the basic 
argument, and to explain a distinct concern in the program. Specifically 
that it undermines a legal archetype. Moreover, while the USA Freedom 
Act does not violate legal archetypes, and hence meets a condition for 
justifiability, it helps illustrate why the bulk metadata program did 
violate archetypes. 
I. THE BASIC ARGUMENT 
There is no shortage of political, academic, and popular 
commentary on the Section 215 bulk metadata program. Some focus on 
legal questions. For example, does the program violate the Foreign 
                                                     
 3 USA FREEDOM Act, Pub. L. No. 114–23, § 101, 129 Stat. 268, 269–71 (2015) (codified as 
amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1861). 
 4 See Jeremy Waldron, Torture and Positive Law: Jurisprudence for the White House, 105 
COLUM. L. REV. 1681, 1718 (2005). 
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Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA)?5 Is it constitutional?6 A substantial 
amount of the commentaries consider whether the program is effective 
(has it thwarted any attacks?).7 Still others focus on what sort of 
inferences government actors could make using telephone metadata, and 
a number of pieces consider whether we have reason to be concerned 
about government actors collecting the data and making those 
inferences.8 Each of these discussions is important. To set the stage for 
this paper I wish to step back and consider what it would take to justify a 
program like bulk telephone metadata collection. 
The first thing to do is to get straight just what one‘s arguments 
are. One might spend lots of time arguing over whether the program is 
legal or not, but legal analysis cannot tell us whether it is a good thing to 
do overall, and it cannot tell us what the proper scope of the law should 
be. One might spend lots of time arguing about the efficacy of the 
program, but that cannot (by itself) tell us whether the program is 
normatively good on balance. 
Hence, as a first step I will to set out the most plausible basic 
argument in support of the program, or of similar programs. The basic 
version of the argument is one that both supporters and detractors of the 
metadata program (or any national security surveillance program) could 
accept as reasonable. The argument and its variations are valid, which is 
to say, that if the premises are true, then they would entail the 
conclusions. Disagreement about the conclusions would therefore be 
                                                     
 5 See, e.g., Susan Freiwald, Nothing to Fear or Nowhere to Hide: Competing Visions of the NSA’s 
215 Program, 12 COLO. TECH. L.J. 309, 320–22 (2014); Laura Donohue, Bulk Metadata 
Collection: Statutory and Constitutional, 37 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL‘Y 757, 764 (2014). 
 6 See, e.g., Donohue, supra note 5, at 764– 65; Freiwald, supra note 5, at 323–27; Randy Barnett, 
Why the NSA Data Seizures are Unconstitutional, 38 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL‘Y 3, 3 (2015). 
 7 ―Liberty and Security in a Changing World,‖ 104. See also PETER BERGEN ET AL., NEW 
AMERICA FOUND., DO NSA‘S BULK SURVEILLANCE PROGRAMS STOP TERRORISTS? 1 (2014) 
(concluding that claims of efficacy ―are overblown and even misleading‖), 
https://static.newamerica.org/attachments/1311-do-nsas-bulk-surveillance-programs-stop-
terrorists/IS_NSA_surveillance.pdf; Mattathias Schwartz, The Whole Haystack: The N.S.A. 
Claims It Needs Access to All Our Phone Records. But is That the Best Way to Catch a 
Terrorist?, NEW YORKER (Jan. 26, 2015), 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/01/26/whole-haystack; Ellen Nakashima, NSA Cites 
Case as Success of Phone Data-Collection Program, WASH. POST (Aug. 8, 2013), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-cites-case-as-success-of-phone-
data-collection-program/2013/08/08/fc915e5a-feda-11e2-96a8-d3b921c0924a_story.html. 
 8 JENNIFER STISA GRANICK, AMERICAN SPIES: MODERN SURVEILLANCE, WHY YOU SHOULD 
CARE, AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT, 105-06 (2017); Bryce Clayton Newell, The Massive 
Metadata Machine: Liberty, Power, and Secret Mass Surveillance in the U.S. and Europe, 10 
I/S: A J. OF L. AND POL‘Y FOR THE INFO. SOC‘Y 481 (2014). 
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based on disagreement about the truth of the premises, or based on 
whether there is sufficient reason to believe the premises. 
The basic argument is what I take to be the most plausible 
argument about the conditions under which mass surveillance by security 
agents is justified. Making the argument explicit allows for several 
things. First, we can see where potential objections to mass surveillance 
fit. Second, we can discern some important conceptual issues. Third, we 
can better articulate the contingent facts that would let us conclude 
whether surveillance of this sort is justified. I will argue that there are 
some important reasons to object to the bulk metadata program. I 
anticipate that there will be reasons for which where others would object, 
or will point out that my framework allows for too much (or too little) 
surveillance. Nonetheless, I hope that the basic argument will allow us to 
better pinpoint the basis of those disagreements. Using the basic 
argument as a roadmap, I will argue that the bulk metadata program is 
plausibly, but not clearly, justifiable. This is far from a clear-cut case. In 
this first part of the paper, I provide several reasons for the thinking that 
the basic argument is unsound. What follows is three versions of a single 
basic argument: one moderate, one strong, and one restrictive. 
A. THE BASIC ARGUMENT (MODERATE VERSION): 
A1  Potential attackers (PAs) use communications systems, including 
telephones, to communicate with other potential attackers, and 
government information gathering about communications by PAs 
is useful in discovering other PAs. 
 
A2  Government information gathering about communications 
(including phone calls) by PAs will likely lead to fewer attacks 
and/or greater ability to prosecute successful attackers (SAs). 
 
A3  Gathering information about all telephone calls will include 
information about phone calls by PAs, and hence will likely lead 
to fewer attacks and/or greater ability to prosecute SAs. (A1, A2) 
 
A4  If a government activity is overall likely to lead to fewer attacks 
and/or greater ability to prosecute persons who successfully plot 
and carry out attacks, and that activity is not illegal, and that 
activity is not rights-violating, then it is permissible. 
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A5  Gathering information about all telephone calls is overall likely to 
lead to fewer attacks and/or greater ability to prosecute SAs. (A3) 
 
A6  Gathering information about all telephone calls is not illegal. 
 
A7  Gathering information about all telephone calls is not rights-
violating. 
 
A8  Therefore, gathering information about all telephone calls is 
permissible. (A4, A5, A6, A7) 
 
Premise A1 is a version of the arguments offered by government 
actors in support of the bulk metadata program.9 It is also plausible 
enough, if only because it says very little. There are some people who 
wish to attack important targets in the United States, they probably use 
communications systems (like most people), and having information 
about some potential attackers is plausibly useful in finding other 
potential attackers (either because they communicate about plans or 
because they have related social networks). There is plenty of room to 
question what counts as a potential attacker. Here, I take potential 
attacker to mean some person who has an actual desire, proclivity, and at 
least minimal ability to carry out a terrorist attack. That is, I do not mean 
potential in an epistemic sense (for all we know, anyone could be an 
attacker). The definition of terrorism is contested, but for our purposes 
here, it is sufficient to follow Primoratz, who offers the following, ―the 
deliberate use of violence, or threat of its use, against innocent people, 
with the aim of intimidating some other people into a course of action 
they otherwise would not take.‖10 Therefore, premise A1 is plausible 
enough and important, but not particularly interesting. 
Premise A2 does substantially more work. It makes an empirical 
claim that posits a causal relation between information gathering and 
later attacks. Whether the basic argument is sound will turn on whether 
A2 is true and I will return to the importance of whether A2 is true 
below. The first part of premise A3 is trivially true; gathering 
information about all calls will entail gathering information about 
                                                     
 9 See PRIVACY & CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BD., REPORT ON THE TELEPHONE RECORDS 
PROGRAM CONDUCTED UNDER SECTION 215 OF THE USA PATRIOT ACT AND ON THE 
OPERATIONS OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT 8–9 (2014) [hereinafter 
―PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BOARD‖]. 
 10 IGOR PRIMORATZ, TERRORISM: A PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATION 24 (2013). 
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potential attackers‘ communications, of which there are at least some 
(per A1). If premise A2 is true, then A3 follows. Notice, though, that one 
might doubt the truth of A2 on the grounds that gathering potential 
attackers‘ communications information with all communications in an 
undifferentiated mass makes it less likely that we will avoid or prosecute 
successful attacks. 
Premises A4-A7 are crucial to getting to the core of the issue 
about the justifiability of the program. Premise A4 makes explicit the 
conditions that matter: effectiveness, legality, and the role of rights (if 
any are at stake). I will address premises A5-A7 in more detail below. 
The gist of the moderate version of the basic argument is 
contained in A4. The premise allows that government actors have some 
discretion to act within the bounds of the law, and without violating 
rights, if their actions are likely to do some good, in this case by stopping 
or prosecuting attacks. There are two other possibilities for whether or 
not government action is justified. One is the restrictive version of the 
argument. Replace A4 with the following: 
 
A4ʹ  Government information collection is permissible if, and only if, 
it is overall likely to lead to fewer attacks and/or greater ability to 
prosecute persons who successfully plot and carry out attacks, and 
that activity is not illegal, and that activity is not rights-violating. 
 
This is not really a serious option, unless we think that government 
information collection is not justifiable for any other reason (e.g., 
administering health codes, doing historical research, or enforcing non-
terrorist related criminal law). 
A more important consideration is the strong version of the basic 
argument, which replaces A4 with the following: 
 
A1 If a government activity is overall likely to lead to fewer attacks 
and/or greater ability to prosecute persons who successfully plot 
and carry out attacks, and that activity is not illegal, and that 
activity is not rights-violating, then it is obligatory for the 
government to pursue it. 
 
This is a more plausible claim than the restricted version. In fact, 
proponents of substantial measures may think this is true; one can 
imagine members of security agencies saying, ‗we have an obligation to 
do everything within our power to stop terrorist attacks.‘ Nonetheless, we 
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can leave aside the strong version for most of our discussion, because 
objections to the moderate version will also be objections to the strong 
version. If it is not permissible for the government to pursue an activity 
that is likely to lead to fewer attacks or greater ability to identify 
successful attackers, then (a fortiori) it also not obligatory. With the 
basic argument in mind, this paper now turns to the bulk metadata 
program. 
II. THE BULK METADATA SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM 
In June 2013, news organizations began publishing stories based 
on the now-famous leaks by former NSA analyst Edward Snowden.11 
Among the programs disclosed was the Section 215 bulk metadata 
surveillance program.12 The program began shortly after the terrorist 
attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon of September 11, 
2001.13 President Bush authorized the NSA to begin collecting the 
content information of certain international communications and bulk 
metadata (or non-content data) from telephone and internet 
communications.14 The president renewed this authorization every 30 to 
60 days, based on a finding of an ―extraordinary emergency‖ until 
2006.15 In May 2006, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) 
approved an order to collect telephone metadata records pursuant to 
Section 215, rather than under a presidential emergency order.16 This 
FISA court-approved program is the basis of the early Snowden 
revelations. 
                                                     
 11 See Glenn Greenwald, NSA Collecting Phone Records of Millions of Verizon Customers Daily, 
GUARDIAN (June 6, 2013, 6:05 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/nsa-
phone-records-verizon-court-order; Barton Gellman & Laura Poitras, U.S., British Intelligence 
Mining Data from Nine U.S. Internet Companies in Broad Secret Program, WASH. POST (June 7, 
2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/us-intelligence-mining-data-from-nine-
us-internet-companies-in-broad-secret-program/2013/06/06/3a0c0da8-cebf-11e2-8845-
d970ccb04497_story.html?hpid=z1. 
 12 See Charlie Savage et al., U.S. Confirms That It Gathers Online Data Overseas, N.Y. TIMES 
(June 6, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/07/us/nsa-verizon-calls.html; James Ball, 
Edward Snowden NSA Files: Secret Surveillance and Our Revelations So Far, GUARDIAN (Aug. 
21, 2013, 3:36 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/21/edward-snowden-nsa-
files-revelations. 
 13 See PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BOARD, supra note 9, at 37. 
 14 Id. at 35, 37. 
 15 Id. at 37 
 16 Id. at 9, 45. 
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To understand the program and its relation to the Basic 
Argument and legal archetypes, it is worth starting with the statute. 
Section 215 of the USA Patriot Act provides as follows: 
The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation or a designee of 
the Director. . . may make an application for an order requiring the 
production of any tangible things (including books, records, papers, 
documents, and other items for an investigation to obtain foreign 
intelligence information. . .to protect against international terrorism 
or clandestine intelligence activities…17 
A couple things are important to note about this provision. First, its 
authority is broad, allowing the FBI to obtain a court order which 
requires others to produce ―any tangible thing‖ in order to protect against 
international terrorism.18 ―Tangible thing‖ includes business records and 
documents.19 Second, despite the top-line breadth in 18 U.S.C. 
1861(a)(1), there are several limitations to orders for tangible things, 
namely, (1) the records sought must be ―relevant to an authorized 
investigation,‖20 (2) investigations may not be based solely on First 
Amendment protected activities of United States persons,21 and (3) the 
FBI must follow minimization procedures in order to limit retention, 
dissemination, and use of records collection.22 The basic features of the 
bulk telephone metadata program align with the Section 215 authority; 
thus, they are worth considering in conjunction. 
Within the bulk telephone metadata program, ―tangible thing‖ 
means the FBI may obtain an order for any tangible thing, including 
business records.23 The FISA court determined that business records 
include records of transactional information (or metadata) about all 
telephone calls handled by telephone companies.24 Such metadata 
includes: the numbers dialed by phones, the numbers calling phones, the 
duration of calls, and the device identification information; but it does 
not include the call content information (which is not metadata) and the 
cell tower location information (which would be metadata, but was 
                                                     
 17 18 U.S.C. § 1861(a)(1) (2002). 
 18 Id. 
 19 Id. 
 20 50 U.S.C. § 1861(b)(2)(B) (2014). 
 21 Id. at (a)(1), (a)(2)(B). 
 22 Id. at (b)(2)(D), (g). 
 23 Id. at (a)(1). 
 24 See PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BOARD, supra note 9, at 45-46. 
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purportedly not collected under the program).25 The FISA court‘s order 
required that telephone companies provide the NSA ―with ‗all call detail 
records‘ generated by those companies.‖26 This generated such a 
substantial amount of information about the calls that it allowed the NSA 
to make a ―‗comprehensive‘ analysis of telephone communications ‗that 
cross different providers and telecommunications networks.‘‖27 The body 
of communications information collected was overwhelmingly from calls 
both placed and received within the United States.28 
―Relevant to‖ means that for records to be subject to Section 215 
requests there must be ―reasonable grounds to believe that the [records] 
are relevant to‖ a foreign intelligence or terrorism investigation.29 The 
FISA Court set a low bar for relevance. Relevance turns on whether 
records requested are  ―necessary for NSA to employ tools that are likely 
to generate useful investigative leads to help identify and track terrorist 
operatives.‖30 The court accepted the following premises: first, bulk data 
collection is necessary to identify the much smaller subset of terrorist 
communications; and second, making connections among 
communications is likely to generate useful investigative leads that help 
identify and track terrorist operatives.31 Hence, the court concluded that 
the bulk metadata program meets the Section 215 relevance 
requirement.32 In order to ensure that the metadata for terrorist 
communications is included in its data, the NSA must collect all the 
metadata.33 Moreover, because the value of metadata may be apparent 
only after connections have been established, the FISA Court has 
determined that the information must be collected on an ongoing basis to 
ensure that historic information is not lost.34 
                                                     
 25 Id. at 21. 
 26 Id. at 22 (quoting In re Application of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for an Order 
Requiring the Production of Tangible Things, Primary Order, No. BR 13-158 (FISA Ct. Oct. 11, 
2013) at 3). 
 27 Id. (quoting Declaration of Teresa H. Shea, Signals Intelligence Director, National Security 
Agency, ¶¶ 59-60, ACLU v. Clapper, No. 13-3994 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 1, 2013))[hereinafter ―Shea 
Decl.‖]. 
 28 Id. at 22. 
 29 50 U.S.C. § 1861(b)(2)(B) (2014) (emphasis added). 
 30 In re Application of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for an Order requiring the Production of 
Tangible Things, No. BR 13-109 (FISA Ct.  July 18, 2003) at 20. 
 31 See PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BOARD, supra note 9, at 43-46. 
 32 See id. at 45. 
 33 Id. at 21. 
 34 Id. at 22. 
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―Minimization procedures‖ are another limitation to records 
requests, and require a minimization plan in any application for a court 
order under Section 215.35 Further, under the primary order, the 
government is prohibited from accessing the data for any other 
intelligence or investigative purpose (e.g., for general law enforcement 
purposes).36 Only a few people (all trained and authorized) have access to 
data, and even then it is accessible via query only.37 Making a query 
requires an approval from a designated official that approval must be 
based on a ―reasonable, articulable suspicion that the selection term is 
associated with terrorism.‖38 
Upon receiving the records from phone companies, the NSA39 
ensures that the data are in a usable format, stores the records in secure 
repositories accessible only by secure networks, and cleans the records of 
unwanted data.40 The records are initially accessible only through a 
querying process, whereby analysts begin with information of interest 
(i.e., suspected of being associated with terrorism) then query their call 
record database to find connections between the seed information and 
other records.41 This allows analysts to find connections among 
individuals and groups based on their communication networks.42 In 
order for an analyst to use seed information to query their database of 
call records, they must first receive approval from a designated official, 
and that approval must be based on a ―reasonable, articulable suspicion 
that the selection term is associated with terrorism.‖43 Analysts may 
conduct queries up to three ―hops‖ removed from their original selection 
term.44 Based on the minimization requirements, ―[t]he vast majority of 
the records the NSA collects are never seen by any person.‖45 ―Only the 
tiny fraction of the telephony metadata records that are responsive to 
                                                     
 35 50 U.S.C. § 1861(b)(2)(D) (2014). 
 36 In re Application of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for an Order Requiring the Production 
of Tangible Things, Primary Order, No. BR 13-158 (FISA Ct. Oct. 11, 2013) at 4. 
 37 See PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BOARD, supra note 9, at 33 (quoting Primary 
Order, at 14). 
 38 Id. at 27 (quoting Primary Order, at 7). 
 39 Section 215 authorizes the FBI to make business records requests. The bulk metadata requests 
specify that phone companies provide the records to the NSA, though the requests are made by 
the FBI. Id. at 42-43. 
 40 Id. at 24-25. 
 41 Id. at 26. 
 42 See id. at 25-26. 
 43 Id. at 27 (quoting Primary Order, at 7). 
 44 Id. at 28-29. 
 45 Id. at 26 (citing Shea Decl., supra note 27). 
RUBEL_PROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 5/15/2017  10:27 AM 
Vol. 34, No. 4 Legal Archetypes 833 
queries authorized under the RAS [reasonable, articulable suspicion] 
standard are extracted, reviewed, or disseminated by NSA intelligence 
analysts, and only under carefully controlled circumstances.‖46 
A. CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS: MILLER AND SMITH 
In addition to legal questions posed under Section 215, there is a 
question as to whether the metadata program was consistent with 
Constitutional protections—specifically whether it violated the Fourth 
Amendment, which provides, ―The right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches 
and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause.‖47A key question in determining whether information 
collection is permissible under the Fourth Amendment is whether it is 
indeed a search (or a seizure). Because the Fourth Amendment applies 
only to ―unreasonable searches and seizures,‖ information that does not 
constitute a search will not be an unreasonable search.48 
Two cases are important in answering this question with respect 
to telephone metadata. In U.S. v. Miller, officers presented a subpoena to 
Miller‘s bank because they had neither probable cause nor a warrant to 
conduct a search of those records.49 The Supreme Court determined that 
Miller‘s bank records were business records held by the bank.50 Hence, 
they were the bank’s records and Miller had no Fourth Amendment 
claim with respect to those records. By conducting business with a bank, 
one voluntarily discloses information and hence ―takes the risk. . .that the 
information will be conveyed by that person to the Government.‖51 
Smith v. Maryland directly pertains to metadata. After 
committing a robbery, Smith made a series of phone calls to the woman 
he had robbed and drove past her home.52 The woman reported the 
license number of the car to police, who used it to find Smith‘s phone 
number.53 The police had the phone company install a ―pen register‖ that 
                                                     
 46 Id. 
 47 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 48 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 49 United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 437-38 (1976). 
 50 Id. at 440-41. 
 51 Id. at 443. 
 52 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 737 (1979). 
 53 Id. 
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recorded the numbers that Smith‘s phone dialed.54 The information they 
collected provided grounds for a warrant to search Smith‘s home.55 The 
Supreme Court determined that Smith had no reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the numbers he dialed.56 As in Miller, the Court determined 
that when people dial phones they willingly share information about the 
numbers they are dialing and the numbers from which they are dialing.57 
Thus, they assume the risk that their information can be revealed to the 
government.58 Based on Miller and Smith, it would appear that the 
program is consistent with the Fourth Amendment. Indeed, a federal 
court dismissed a plaintiff‘s request to enjoin the program, concluding 
that they were unlikely to prevail on their claims that the program 
violates FISA and the Fourth Amendment.59 
B. LEGAL CRITICISMS 
The features of Section 215 and the bulk metadata program make 
it appear plausible that the program is legal per statute and consistent 
with the Fourth Amendment. That is, metadata is a form of business 
record and hence a tangible thing. There is a sense in which requests are 
relevant to ongoing investigations, and there were minimization 
procedures in place per the FISA court‘s order. 
There are a number of criticisms of using Section 215 as the 
legal basis for the bulk metadata program. One criticism is that Section 
215 permits the FBI to obtain an order for business records, but under the 
program, it is the NSA that receives and analyzes information.60 The 
Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB) makes the case 
that this conflicts with the statute, for several reasons.61 First, records 
sought must be relevant to an authorized FBI investigation; however, 
because the NSA receives the records and is indeed prohibited from 
sharing its analysis with the FBI, the program conflicts with a key goal of 
                                                     
 54 Id. 
 55 Id. 
 56 See id. at 744. 
 57 Id. at 743-44. 
 58 Id. at 744. 
 59 ACLU v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724, 754 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); see also David S. Kris, On the 
Bulk Collection of Tangible Things, 7 J. NAT‘L SECURITY L. & POL‘Y 209 (2014); PRIVACY AND 
CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BOARD, supra note 9, at 64. 
 60 PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BOARD, supra note 9, at 87-91. 
 61 See id. 
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the statute.62 Second, the minimization procedures under Section 215 are 
to be ―adopted by the Attorney General‖ to govern the ―retention and 
dissemination by the Federal Bureau of Investigation‖ of the items or 
information it receives.‖63 The minimization procedures directed at the 
FBI need not apply to the NSA, and hence the FISA court could not 
make a finding that the FBI adopted minimization procedures are 
adequate.64 Most importantly, using Section 215 to support an NSA bulk 
metadata program conflicts with an important justification for the statute 
in first place, namely that the FBI lacked necessary statutory authority to 
conduct its own investigations.65 In defending the statute, the Obama 
Administration stated: ―Section 215 was enacted because the FBI lacked 
the ability, in national security investigations, to seek business records in 
a way similar to its ability to seek records using a grand jury subpoena in 
a criminal case or an administrative subpoena in civil investigations.‖66 
In a sense, criticizing the program based on which agency carries 
it out is a slight criticism, though it points to a willingness to stretch 
statutory language. A more significant criticism, which further pushes 
the law, concerns the relevance requirement. Under Section 215, a 
request for an order must be based on ―reasonable grounds to believe that 
the [records] are relevant to‖ a foreign intelligence or terrorism 
investigation.67 The FISA Court determines that the records are relevant 
if they are ―necessary for NSA to employ tools that are likely to generate 
useful investigative leads to help identify and track terrorist operatives.‖68 
Moreover, the court has concluded that bulk data collection is necessary 
in order to find the terrorist communications and that making 
connections amongst networks would likely lead to investigative leads 
and help identify and track terrorist operatives.69 Thus, the FISA court 
determined that the program meets the Section 215 relevance 
                                                     
 62 Id. at 88-89. 
 63 Id. at 89-90; 50 U.S.C. § 1861(g)(1) (2014). 
 64 50 U.S.C. § 1861(g)(1). 
 65 PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BOARD, supra note 9, at 88 (quoting EXEC. OFFICE 
OF THE PRESIDENT, ADMINISTRATION WHITE PAPER: BULK COLLECTION OF TELEPHONY 
METADATA UNDER SECTION 215 OF THE USA PATRIOT ACT 6, n. 2 (2013) [hereinafter 
ADMINISTRATION WHITE PAPER]). 
 66 Id. 
 67 § 1861(b)(2)(B). 
 68 See In re Application of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for an Order requiring the 
Production of Tangible Things, No. BR 13-109 (FISA Ct.  July 18, 2003) Amended 
Memorandum Opinion at 20. 
 69 Id. at 21. 
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requirement. Put differently, to ensure that the communications 
information of a terrorist suspect is included, the NSA was permitted to 
collect all metadata. Further, the court allowed that metadata may be 
continually collected in order to ensure that old information is retained.70 
The PCLOB was highly critical of the government‘s 
interpretation of the relevance requirement, calling it ―untenable,‖ 
―dangerously overbroad,‖ and implying that ―virtually all information 
may be relevant to counterterrorism and therefore subject to collection by 
the government.‖71 This criticism is based on the FISA court‘s finding 
that bulk metadata collection was necessary for creation of useful tools, 
―bulk collection is necessary for NSA to employ tools that are likely to 
generate useful investigative leads to help identify and track terrorist 
operatives.‖72 The Southern District of New York in ACLU v. Clapper 
deployed a similar understanding of relevance based on the necessity of 
creating counterterrorism tools.73 As the PCLOB points out, this is 
overbroad. Surely having all possible information about all Americans 
would help find terrorists, but that per the PCLOB, cannot be the basis of 
a relevance claim.74 
Further, Section 215 requires that information sought must be 
relevant to ―an authorized investigation.‖ The FISA court‘s interpretation 
of relevance is based on the relevance of a complete dataset for any 
authorized investigation. This interpretation, however, belies the 
requirement under Section 215 that the government provide ―a statement 
of facts‖ showing ―reasonable grounds to believe‖ records are relevant to 
an investigation.75 This language implies that a unique set of facts will 
link the records sought to some particular investigation. But the FISA 
court‘s interpretation only requires two very broad facts for any phone 
metadata request, ―that terrorists communicate by telephone, and that it is 
necessary to collect records in bulk to find the connections that can be 
uncovered by NSA analysis.‖76 
                                                     
 70 Id. at 20. 
 71 PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BOARD, supra note 9, at 60. 
 72 Id. at 61 (citing In re Application of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for an Order Requiring 
the Production of Tangible Things, Amended Memorandum Opinion, No. BR 13-109 (FISA Ct. 
Aug. 29, 2013) at 20). 
 73 See ACLU v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
 74 PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BOARD, supra note 9, at 62. 
 75 Id. at 62-63. 
 76 Id.  
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Still another criticism is that the constitutional authorities upon 
which the metadata program relies cannot support the program‘s scope. 
Miller involved a narrow investigation into one person‘s bank records, 
and Smith v. Maryland was an investigation into a robbery.77 Each 
collection of third-party information was prompted by a single 
investigation, and the information collected was limited to that which 
shed light on that investigation.78 But the bulk metadata program 
involves millions upon millions of individuals‘ records, collected 
through tools much more sophisticated than those available and used 
when Smith and Miller were decided.79 The vast number of records 
collected allows many more people to be investigated (indeed, 
potentially anyone communicating with a cell phone on the networks 
subject to the orders during the period in which the program has 
operated).80 Indeed, the PCLOB and the District Court for the District of 
Columbia have argued that the program pushes against constitutional 
limits.81 The Board emphasized the ―rapid technological changes and in 
light of the nationwide, ongoing nature of the program‖ as key 
differences between the program and Smith.82 
In Klayman v. Obama, the District Court for the District of 
Columbia granted a preliminary injunction against the program based on 
Fourth Amendment concerns.83 The court also emphasized that bulk 
metadata collection is a far cry from the pen register in Smith.84 Instead, 
the court turned to U.S. v. Jones, where the Supreme Court held that 
police placing a GPS device on a car for several weeks was a search.85 
Concurring in Jones, Justice Sotomayor distinguished between long-term 
monitoring and more isolated information gathering, allowing constant 
following via GPS could constitute a search; even where discrete 
elements of that following would not.86 Following Jones, the D.C. court 
determined that bulk metadata collection could constitute a search even 
where discrete collection of metadata would not.87 
                                                     
 77 Smith, 442 U.S. 735, 737-38; Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 436-38. 
 78 See generally Smith, 442 U.S. at 737; Miller, 425 U.S. at 438. 
 79 PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BOARD, supra note 9, at 127. 
 80 See id. at 114. 
 81 Id.; see Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
 82 PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BOARD, supra note 9, at 114. 
 83 Klayman, 957 F. Supp. 2d at 43. 
 84 Id. at 31-32. 
 85 U.S. v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 406-07 (2012) (slip op.). 
 86 Id. at 413-31 (Sotomayor, J. concurring). 
 87 Klayman, 957 F. Supp. 2d at 37. 
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C. THE USA FREEDOM ACT 
In June 2015, Congress passed, and the president signed into 
law, the USA Freedom Act.88 The legislation was inspired by the 
controversy surrounding the bulk metadata program, and makes 
important modifications to the business records provisions upon which 
the program was based.89 The Freedom Act performs several specific 
functions. First, perhaps most importantly, it requires that FBI 
applications for orders for the production of tangible things be based on a 
specific selection term.90 As such, the production of all call detail records 
in bulk is not permissible under this provision. Second, it allows 
information to be collected from up to two ―hops‖ from the specific 
selection term.91 Third, the Act limits what kinds of business records may 
be collected.92 It specifically excludes communications content—names, 
addresses, and financial information of subscribers—and location 
information (GPS or cell tower information).93 Fourth, the act requires 
the FISA court order approving the production of tangible things to 
include selection terms.94 The Act also includes FISA court related 
changes, in particular establishing amicus curiae to help review legality 
of records collection and other matters.95 It also makes publicly available 
any significant new constructions and interpretations of law.96 
In sum, the bulk metadata program is plausibly legal, though the 
interpretations of the statutes are aggressive and push against the limits 
of the statutory language. The program is also plausibly consistent with 
important Fourth Amendment cases, though that too is an uneasy fit. The 
USA Freedom Act may address some of these concerns; I will revisit that 
in Part IV. 
                                                     
 88 Uniting and Strengthening America by Fulfilling Rights and Ensuring Effective Discipline over 
Monitoring Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-23, 129 Stat. 268. 
 89 See id. 
 90 Id. at § 103. 
 91 Id. at § 101. 
 92 Id. at § 107. 
 93 Id. 
 94 Id. at § 103. 
 95 Id. at § 401. 
 96 Id. at § 402. 
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III. THE BASIC ARGUMENT REVISITED 
Let us return to the Basic Argument. As the basic argument 
makes clear, the legality of the metadata program is a necessary 
condition for its permissibility. The mere fact that the program is legal 
does not entail that the law is as it should be. Moreover, the laws relevant 
here—the Patriot Act §215 and the Fourth Amendment—create a legal 
permission conducting surveillance under certain conditions.97 The laws 
do not create a positive obligation to act. Surveillance is discretionary 
and there remains a question of when exercising that discretion is 
justified. The bulk of the basic argument is meant to answer that 
question. 
Premise A4 states that if: (1) a government activity is overall 
likely to lead to fewer attacks or a greater ability to prosecute persons 
who successfully plot and carry out attacks, (2) that activity is not illegal, 
and (3) that activity is not rights-violating; then it is permissible. The 
crux of premise 4 is that it sets out a familiar juxtaposition between 
consequences and rights. On the one hand, it takes into account the 
consequences of a government action and posits that when the 
consequences of that action are beneficial overall, it is permissible 
(absent rights violations and illegality). Coupled with premise A5—that 
bulk metadata collection will lead to fewer attacks or prosecution for 
attacks—we get a conclusion about the overall consequences of metadata 
collection. But is premise A4 true? 
In ―Security and Liberty: The Image of Balance,‖ Jeremy 
Waldron addresses the idea that, in light of terrorist threats, the US and 
other Western democracies must strike a ―balance‖ between security and 
liberty.98 Waldron interprets this notion of balance to be an implicit 
adoption of consequentialism.99 The argument is as follows, because we 
have become aware of greater threats to physical well-being, and on the 
assumption that close adherence to certain civil liberties make the 
likelihood of those threats greater, it will lead to better consequences to 
have less protection for those civil liberties.100 As Waldron points out, at 
least some goods are not important based solely on consequences.101 For 
                                                     
 97 50 U.S.C. § 1861(a)(1) (2002). 
 98 See Jeremy Waldron, Security and Liberty: The Image of Balance, 11 J. POLITICAL PHIL., no. 2, 
2003, at 191. 
 99 Id. at 194–95 . 
 100 Id. at 195–96. 
 101 Id. at 196–97. 
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example, rights to free speech, conscience, association, due process, and 
so forth are on many conceptions not based on the good consequences 
that result.102 For this reason, premise A4 allows that government activity 
leading to good consequences is not permissible where there are rights 
violations. 
Even if we set aside the argument that better consequences alone 
do not suffice to override rights, there is a question of just what 
consequences count. Premise A4 recognizes the negative consequences 
of terrorist attacks and the positive consequences of government activity 
that can help thwart those attacks. This seriously undercounts the 
potential negative consequences. Waldron‘s ―Image of Balance‖ 
provides further guidance here. In discussing what outcomes are relevant 
in determining whether curtailing civil liberties is justified, he points to 
the traditional apprehension of state power found in liberal political 
theory: 
[A]n increase in the power of the state may be necessary to prevent or 
diminish the prospect of that horror [of catastrophic terrorist attacks]. 
But the existence of a threat from terrorist attack does not diminish 
the threat that liberals have traditionally apprehended from the 
state…We have to worry that the very means given to the 
government to combat our enemies will be used by the government 
against its enemies—and although these two classes ―enemies of the 
people‖ and ―enemies of the state‖ overlap, they are not necessarily 
co-extensive.103 
The idea is a familiar one, but worth keeping in mind. There is 
no question that terrorist threats are real, and that the NSA and other 
security and law enforcement agents aim to diminish those threats. Any 
government agency can also mischaracterize or misinterpret persons 
opposed to the government, or doing something that the government 
does not like, as being threats to people generally. Consider the murky 
case of Snowden himself. One possibility is that Snowden‘s actions have 
actually made people in the United States and elsewhere more vulnerable 
to attack. He is also deeply embarrassing to the US government, to 
national security agencies, and to national security contractors. It is 
reasonable to interpret the government‘s enthusiasm in apprehending and 
discrediting Snowden as based on mixed motives and including an 
                                                     
 102 Id.; see also Joseph Raz. Practical Reason and Norms, 37 (1999); Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State 
and Utopia, 28 (1974). 
 103 Waldron, supra note 98, at 205–06. 
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element of score settling on behalf of the government, agencies, and 
contractors. 
What dangers loom from metadata gathering? It is difficult to 
know for certain, but there are several dangers we can consider. The 
most important, is the potential for misuse of intelligence. As the 
PCLOB stated, ―An even more compelling danger is that personal 
information collected by the government will be misused to harass, 
blackmail, or intimidate, or to single out for scrutiny particular 
individuals or groups.‖104 The board describes a number of cases of 
improper searching.105 These do not appear to be intentional.106 
Nonetheless, the wrongs of that kind of abuse are particularly acute; it is 
not merely the bad consequences that result, but the violation of official 
capacities and trust. 
Based on this idea, we need to modify premise A4 of the basic 
argument as follows: 
 
A4ʺʹ If a government activity is overall likely to lead to fewer attacks 
and/or greater ability to prosecute persons who successfully plot 
and carry out attacks, and does not create other threats of similar 
(or greater) magnitude, and that activity is not illegal, and that 
activity is not rights-violating, then it is permissible. 
 
We also need to add an additional premise to the basic argument to make 
it valid: 
 
A9 Gathering information about all telephone calls does not create 
threats that are as likely and of similar magnitude as the threats 
that the surveillance thwarts. 
 
As noted in the previous section, premise A4 recognizes the importance 
of both the consequences of government activity and rights, and avoids 
reducing respect for rights to an exercise in maximizing welfare. 
Therefore, an activity may be impermissible if it either fails to generate 
overall better consequences or it impinges rights. In addition, as noted in 
the previous section, there are at least some reasons to be suspicious that 
the consequences are on balance positive. First, it is unclear how 
                                                     
 104 PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BOARD, supra note 9, at 12. 
 105 Id. at 47–56. 
 106 Id. at 12. 
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substantial the positive consequences of mass metadata collection are.107 
Second, the potential negative consequences of government surveillance 
tend to be undercounted.108 
Suppose that on balance there are benefits to the surveillance. 
Perhaps it substantially decreases the likelihood of attacks and it does not 
entail large opportunity costs, and that there are enough checks in place 
to guard against state power.109 The question then is whether there are 
other considerations that would render the program unjustified. As 
premise A4 entails, the existence of some right could do so; though 
premise A7 states that the program does not infringe rights. Elsewhere I 
have argued that the Section 215 program does infringe privacy rights, 
though those infringements are limited.110 Nevertheless, for the sake of 
argument here, suppose there is not an individual right that is violated by 
the collection of metadata. That is, assume, for the sake of reaching the 
question of legal archetypes below, that bulk metadata collection cannot 
be wrong based on a series of rights violations on the grounds that there 
is no such individual right. 
IV. LEGAL ARCHETYPES 
So what‘s left? Here I want to return to premise A4: 
 
A4ʺʹ If a government activity is overall likely to lead to fewer attacks 
and/or greater ability to prosecute persons who successfully plot 
and carry out attacks, and does not create other threats of similar 
(or greater) magnitude, and that activity is not illegal, and that 
activity is not rights-violating, then it is permissible. 
 
                                                     
 107 See Waldron, supra note 98, at 207–08. 
 108 Id. 
 109 Consider the conclusions of the Presidents Group on Intelligence and Communications 
Technologies: ―the information contributed to terrorist investigations by the use of Section 215 
telephony meta-data was not essential to preventing attacks and could readily have been obtained 
in a timely manner using  conventional Section 215 orders.‖ ―Liberty and Security in a Changing 
World,‖ EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, LIBERTY AND SECURITY IN A CHANGING WORLD: 
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE PRESIDENT‘S REVIEW GROUP ON INTELLIGENCE AND 
COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGIES 104 (Dec. 12, 2013). See also Peter Bergen, David Sterman, 
Emily Schneider, & Bailey Cahall, Do NSA’s Bulk Surveillance Programs Stop Terrorists, 1 
(Jan. 2014)(concluding that claims of efficacy ―are overblown and even misleading.‖). 
 110 Alan Rubel, Privacy Transparency, and Accountability in the NSA’s Bulk Metadata Program, in 
PRIVACY, SECURITY, AND ACCOUNTABILITY 183–202 (Adam Moore ed., 2015). 
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In particular, I want to consider the issue of ―not illegal.‖ The ambiguity 
in that phrasing is important. As discussed Part II, the PCLOB found 
substantial fault in the legal reasoning of the FISA court, because the 
issuing orders for phone metadata pushed ―relevance‖ beyond what the 
concept could hold and ignored the statute‘s specification that the FBI 
(rather than the NSA) obtain an order for tangible things. At least one 
federal court has suggested that the program impermissibly extended 
what could be allowed under the Fourth Amendment.111 
In ―Torture and Positive Law: Jurisprudence for the White 
House,‖ Jeremy Waldron argues that some legal rules operate in law as 
principles that go beyond a narrow articulation in statutes and 
constitutional provisions.112 These are pervasive principles or legal 
archetypes.113 Waldron‘s target is the legal wrangling that sought to 
justify torture by the United States in the aftermath of September 11, 
2001. His argument takes as a starting point the three defining currents in 
the debates about whether suspected terrorists could be subjected to 
torture.114 The first is a 2002 memo authored by John Yoo arguing that 
the United States should not recognize Geneva Convention protections 
for prisoners from Al Qaeda and the Taliban.115 The Yoo memo argued 
that members of Al Qaeda and the Taliban were not protected because 
the type of armed conflict in which they were involved was not explicitly 
protected in the Geneva Conventions.116 The second defining current is 
the publications of Alan Dershowitz, a law professor at Harvard. 
Dershowitz argued that torture was morally justified on consequentialist 
grounds, and that there should be a legally recognized procedure (judicial 
warrants) underwriting particular instances of torture that are likely have 
substantial beneficial consequences.117 The third is a memorandum 
signed by Jay Bybee (then head of the Office of Legal Counsel in the US 
Department of Justice) narrowing the definition of ‗torture‘ so that it 
                                                     
 111 Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
 112 See Jeremy Waldron, Torture and Positive Law: Jurisprudence for the White House, 105 
COLUM. L. REV. 1681 (2005). 
 113 Id. 
 114 Id. at 1684–86. 
 115 Id. at 1684 (citing U.S. Dept. of Justice, Off. of Legal Couns., Memorandum of John Yoo and 
Robert Delahunty for William J. Haynes II regarding the Application of Treaties and Laws to Al 
Qaeda and Taliban Detainees (Jan. 9, 2002)) [hereinafter ―Yoo Memo‖]. 
 116 Id. at 1685 (citing Yoo Memo, at 11–25). 
 117 Id. at 1685 (citing ALAN DERSHOWITZ, SHOUTING FIRE: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN A TURBULENT AGE 
470–77 (2002)). 
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excluded many cases of the deliberate infliction of pain.118 Specifically, 
the memo argued that torture included only inflicting the degree of pain 
associated with organ failure or death.119 
Waldron‘s concern is not that these legal moves in support of 
torture are (ipso facto) in support of something that is morally prohibited. 
Rather, it is that they seek to place a legal imprimatur on torture.120 They 
narrowly parse legal language (in the case of the Yoo and Bybee memos) 
or normalize torture within legal procedure (the arguments for torture 
warrants).121 Exacting treatment of legal language and creation of 
procedures to avoid ad hoc rules is what lawyers often do. In Waldron‘s 
view, however, it is inappropriate in some cases because doing so 
contradicts legal principles, viz cases involving legal archetypes.122 
According to Waldron, because torture is such an archetype, the torture 
memos and articles by Yoo, Bybee, and Dershowitz are unjustifiable.123 
Waldron‘s understanding of legal archetypes shows how premise 
A4 of the basic argument is incomplete. Premise A4 focuses on 
government activity that has positive consequences, is not rights-
violating, and which is not illegal. Nevertheless, Waldron‘s sense of 
archetypes carves out a conceptual space between the moral 
considerations of rights and consequences and the legal space. Legal 
archetypes are principles that are part of law, even if they are not 
explicitly articulated in statutes and constitutions. 
The importance of legal archetypes is that they are engrained as 
part of the law so undermining them will damage the larger body of law 
itself. 
When I use the term ―archetype,‖ I mean a particular provision in a 
system of norms which has a significance going beyond its 
immediate normative content, a significance stemming from the fact 
that it sums up or makes vivid to us the point, purpose, principle, or 
policy of a whole area of law. Like a Dworkinian principle, the 
archetype performs a background function in a given legal system. 
But archetypes differ from Dworkinian principles and policies in that 
they also operate as foreground provisions. They work in the 
                                                     
 118 Waldron, supra note 112, at 1685. 
 119 Id. at 1685 (citing U.S. Dept. of Justice, Off. of Legal Couns., Memorandum of Jay S. Bybee for 
Alberto R. Gonzales regarding the Standards of Conduct for Interrogation under 18 U.S.C. §§ 
2340-2340A (Aug. 1, 2002)). 
 120 Id. at 1735. 
 121 Id. at 1694, 1706–07, 1716. 
 122 Id. at 1735. 
 123 Id. at 1734–39. 
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foreground as rules or precedents, but in doing so, they sum up the 
spirit of a whole body of law that goes beyond what they might be 
thought to require on their own terms. The idea of an archetype, then, 
is the idea of a rule or positive law provision that operates not just on 
its own account, and does not just stand simply in a cumulative 
relation to other provisions, but operates also in a way that expresses 
or epitomizes the spirit of a whole structured area of doctrine, and 
does so vividly, effectively, and publicly, establishing the 
significance of that area for the entire legal enterprise.124 
Waldron is drawing on a key thread of analytic jurisprudence over the 
past several decades. Specifically, he is referencing Ronald Dworkin‘s  
―Model of Rules I.‖125 There, Dworkin distinguishes between legal rules 
and legal principles.126 Legal rules are rules which when they operate are 
dispositive.127 That is, rules are ―all-or-nothing,‖ when they apply they 
provide a unique answer to a legal case. In contrast, legal principles are, 
as Michael Plaxton puts it, ―the background motivations and reasons 
which justify the creation and existence of the specific rules in a legal 
system.‖128 Legal principles, according to Dworkin, are part of law 
itself.129 They are not moral principles about what law should be, but 
principles built into law itself that are instantiated in the positive law of 
statutes, cases, constitutions, administrative rules, and other facets of 
positive law. 
Waldron‘s understanding of archetypes is, per Plaxton, ―a hybrid 
of rules and principles.‖130 The archetype is iconic or emblematic because 
it makes clear the reason for the existence of certain sets of legal rules. In 
the case of archetypes, the specifics of legal rules are the background; 
they matter less than the deeper, moral justifications for those rules. As 
the specific legal rules instantiate those moral justifications, those 
justifications are part of law itself.131 So, by way of example, Waldron 
argues that what is important about habeas corpus statutes is not their 
precise content—though, of course, procedure matters—rather, it is that 
habeas corpus statutes as a whole are justified by, embody, and make 
vivid the deeper moral fact that persons should never be confined 
                                                     
 124 Id. at 1723. 
 125 See Ronald M. Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 13 (1967). 
 126 Id. at 22–23. 
 127 Id. at 25. 
 128 Michael Plaxton, Reflections on Waldron’s Archetypes, 30 L. & PHIL., no. 1, 2011, at 77, 80. 
 129 See Dworkin, supra note 125, at 22–23. 
 130 Plaxton, supra note 128, at 81. 
 131 Waldron, supra note 112, at 1723. 
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arbitrarily.132 Similarly, Waldron draws on the case of Brown v. Board of 
Education to demonstrate archetypes: 
In itself, Brown v. Board of Education is authority for a fairly narrow 
proposition about segregation in schools, and its immediate effect in 
desegregation was notoriously slaw and limited. But its archetypal 
power is staggering: In the years since 1954 it has become an icon of 
the law‘s commitment to demolish the structures of de jure (and 
perhaps also de facto) segregation and to pursue and discredit forms 
of discrimination and badges of racial inferiority wherever they crop 
up in American law or public administration.133 
The focus on the narrow language and specific legal rule articulated in 
Brown misses the deeper significance of the ruling as being justified by 
and embodying a deeper, moral value of non-discrimination. Suppose, 
for example, that a court made a narrow, language-parsing argument that 
some forms of educational discrimination were permissible (despite 
Brown). They might abide language of Brown while undermining the 
legal archetype of non-discrimination. 
Waldron‘s target is torture. He argues that rules against torture 
(be they based on Geneva Conventions, or statutes defining what torture 
is) are ―archetypal of a certain policy having to do with the relation 
between law and force, and the force with which law rules.‖134 Even 
though governing by law deploys physical force, it ought not deploy 
force brutally, ―Law is not brutal in its operation. Law is not savage. Law 
does not rule through abject fear and terror, or by breaking the will of 
those whom it confronts.‖135 Now, of course uses of the law may be 
brutal, just as uses of the law may arbitrarily detain people or 
discriminate on the basis of race. Such uses, however, are wrong and the 
rules against torture, of habeas corpus, and against discrimination 
instantiate and make vivid the deeper principles that render those uses 
wrong. Hence, it is not merely that torture (or habeas corpus, or equal 
protection) laws are justified by underlying moral principles, but when 
such laws instantiate such principles, the principles themselves may be 
archetypes. The problem Waldron sees in the Yoo and Bybee memos, 
which narrowly parse who is subject to torture prohibitions and whether 
torture is limited to injury that tends to lead to organ failure or death, is 
that such parsing undermines the legal archetype that torture statutes 
                                                     
 132 Id. at 1724. 
 133 Id. at 1725 (citing Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)). 
 134 Id. at 1726. 
 135 Id. 
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instantiate. The problem with Dershowitz‘s arguments for torture 
warrants is that it would be a legally cognizable instrument directly 
contradicting those archetypes. Again, as Plaxton explains where legal 
archetypes are in play, lawyers are responsible for interpreting them 
broadly so as not to cut it close at all: 
[T]here is something wrong with trying to pin down the prohibition 
on torture with a precise legal definition. Insisting on exact 
definitions may sound very lawyerly, but there is something 
disturbing about it when the quest for precision is put to work in the 
service of a mentality that says, ―Give us a definition so we have 
something to work around, something to game, a determinate 
envelope to push.‖136 
Two further features of archetypes are relevant here. Waldron writes that 
his claim regarding archetypes has two aspects. First, there must be a 
―body of law in question [which] is pervaded by a certain principle or 
policy.‖ Second, the provision in question must be archetypal of that 
policy or principle in that it renders lesser violation inconsequential.137 
Note that this second feature is not a slippery slope argument. It is not 
that violation of an archetype makes additional, more consequential 
violations easier. Rather, it is that the violation of the archetype makes 
lesser violations more palatable. Hence, violating torture archetypes will 
make less severe forms of brutality (harsh treatment upon arrest, minor 
and arbitrary deprivations) seem routine or small beer. Indeed, Waldron 
emphasizes that this is the reverse of slippery slope; rather than being at 
the top and likely to slip to the bottom, undermining an archetype is 
staking out territory at the bottom of a slope, such that points further up 
appear better by comparison.138 
So, we come to the crux of the argument: whether the bulk 
metadata program undermines a legal archetype. Premise A4 of the basic 
argument, again, allows that surveillance programs are permissible when 
(1) they have good consequences (i.e., lead to fewer attacks or greater 
ability to prosecute persons who successfully plot and carry out attacks), 
(2) are not rights-violating, and (3) are not illegal. But Waldron‘s 
understanding of legal archetypes shows that this premise contains an 
ambiguity.  The question for surveillance becomes whether the bulk 
metadata program violates a legal archetype. I would argue that it does 
                                                     
 136 Id. at 1687; see also Plaxton, supra note 128, at 84. 
 137 Waldron, supra note 112, at 1729. 
 138 Id. at 1735. 
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and to make the case I will first, articulate what the archetype is, and then 
the body of law that is pervaded by that principle. Next, I will show that 
the provision in question (here the bulk metadata program) is an 
archetypal violation in that it renders lesser violations inconsequential. 
First, what is the archetype? The most plausible case is the idea 
of individualized suspicion. Persons in the United States must be 
investigated and have their information deliberately collected for reasons 
that are traceable to that person. I believe this idea is indeed an 
archetype, such that there is a body of law pervaded by that principle, for 
several reasons. First, at the broadest level the Fourth Amendment 
protects against ―unreasonable‖ searches and seizures, and requires that 
warrants will be issued only where there is probable cause—some degree 
of individualized suspicion.139 That individualized suspicion is built into 
the Constitution is a good foundation for a legal archetype. The argument 
is that there is a moral value embodied in the Fourth Amendment that 
constitutes an archetype. Second, there are a number of Fourth 
Amendment cases that recognize the need to be wary of technological 
encroachments on privacy.140 These cases include Jones, discussed 
above, where the Supreme Court determined that attaching a GPS unit to 
a car and tracking it for weeks constituted a search, and a concurrence 
maintained that amassing lots of data may itself violate a constitutional 
right (even if collection of a smaller amount of data may have been 
permissible.)141 
The final criterion for Waldron‘s archetypes is whether the 
program renders lesser violations inconsequential. This is the crux of the 
matter. In the case of torture, one of Waldron‘s key concerns is that 
narrow parsing of legal language so as to allow brutal treatment that 
ought to fall under torture prohibitions will make lesser forms of 
brutality seem tame by comparison, and hence less likely to be restricted 
or abhorred. A similar concern is warranted in the case of bulk metadata 
collection. Once the NSA has gathered metadata in bulk, smaller (though 
still pervasive) collections of communications information hardly seem 
so bad. Indeed, the hard-fought and important legal victory of the 
passage of the USA Freedom Act still allows collection of metadata from 
selection terms, and collection of metadata two ―hops‖ away from those 
                                                     
 139 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 140 See generally Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 347 (1967); United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 
705 (1984); Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001); Florida v. Jardines, 133 U.S. 1409 
(2013) (Kagan, J., concurring); Riley v. California, 134 U.S. 2473 (2014). 
 141 U.S. v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 412–17 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
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terms.142 That is still intrusive, and perhaps in accord with what people 
thought was originally allowable under the Section 215. Moreover, 
gathering of metadata by other law enforcement and security agencies, 
even on a limited basis, does not seem to raise an eyebrow. 
It is worth pausing here to recognize that the argument that the 
bulk metadata program undermines legal archetypes need not depend 
solely on US statutory and Constitutional law. The idea of a legal 
archetype turns on the concept of law, and principles that inhere in law 
even where not explicit. Hence, while the arguments so far have 
addressed the particular program at work in the United States and legal 
archetypes that inhere in US law, there is reason to think that similar 
archetypes inhere in other law and that data collection programs may 
conflict with those as well. 
Consider two recent issues before the United Kingdom‘s 
Investigatory Powers Tribunal (IPT), both advanced by the 
nongovernmental agency Privacy International.143 The first involves a 
challenge to computer hacking conducted by Government 
Communications Headquarters (―GCHQ‖). Among the Snowden 
revelations was information that GCHQ had participated in NSA-
initiated programs and had substantial surveillance operations with 
comparatively light oversight.144 In a report of the UK Investigatory 
Powers Review (―A Question of Trust‖), David Anderson, QC describes 
several examples of what Privacy International calls computer network 
exploitation, or CNE: 
Examples in the documents  describing the  use  of  this  technique  
by  GCHQ  included  a  programme  called  NOSEY  SMURF which  
involved  implanting  malware  to  activate  the  microphone  on  
smart  phones, DREAMY  SMURF,  which  had the capability to 
switch  on smart  phones, TRACKER SMURF which had the 
capability to provide the location of a target‘s smart phone with high-
                                                     
 142 Uniting and Strengthening America by Fulfilling Rights and Ensuring Effective Discipline over 
Monitoring Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-23, § 101, 129 Stat. 268, 269–71. 
 143 Privacy International v. Greennet, Ltd. [2016] UKIP 14_85 CH (U.K.). 
 144 See generally Ewan MacAskill, Julian Borger, Nick Hopkins, Nick Davies & James Ball, The 
Legal Loopholes that Allow GCHQ to Spy on the World, THE GUARDIAN (June 21, 2013), 
https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2013/jun/21/legal-loopholes-gchq-spy-world; Nick Hopkins, 
UK Gathering Secret Intelligence via Covert NSA Operation, THE GUARDIAN (June 7, 2013), 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2013/jun/07/uk-gathering-secret-intelligence-nsa-
prism. 
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precision, and PARANOID SMURF which ensured malware 
remained hidden.145 
Privacy International filed a legal complaint with the Investigatory 
Powers Tribunal (IPT), and seven internet service providers filed similar 
complaints.146 The tribunal determined that the programs were lawful and 
consistent with Articles 8 and 10 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights.147 Privacy International has sought review of the tribunal‘s 
decision in the UK Administrative Court. 148 What is important for the 
purposes of this paper is that Privacy International‘s arguments are 
similar to the archetype arguments that Waldron raises in the context of 
torture and that I have outlined here. 
Among the key issues in Greennet was whether section 5 of the 
United Kingdom‘s Intelligence Services Act of 1994 authorizes the kind 
of broad computer network exploitation revealed in Snowden‘s leaks and 
in ―A Question of Trust.‖ Section 5(2) states that 
The Secretary of State may, on an application made by the Security 
Service, the Intelligence Service or GCHG, issue a warrant under this 
section authorizing the taking. . .of such action as is specified in the 
warrant in respect of any property so specified or in respect of 
wireless telegraphy so specified. . . 
While Privacy International maintained that the most plausible 
construction of Section 5 requires warrants specify persons or properties, 
they also held that common law ―sets its face against general warrants,‖ 
and that thus the IPT should conclude that no warrant could allow the 
broad CNE that GCHQ had been conducting.149 The government argued 
that the use of ―specified‖ in the statute does not require specification of 
persons, locations, or properties. Rather, all that is required is ―the best 
description possible.‖150 The IPT agreed with the government.151 
In its claim seeking review of the IPT decision, Privacy 
International argues that cases prohibiting general warrants are grounded 
                                                     
 145 DAVID ANDERSON, Q.C. A QUESTION OF TRUST: REPORT OF THE INVESTIGATORY POWERS 
REVIEW 332 (June 2015), https://terrorismlegislationreviewer.independent.gov.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2015/06/IPR-Report-Print-Version.pdf. 
 146 See generally Greennet, UKIP 14_85 CH. 
 147 Id. at ¶ 89. 
 148 Id. at Statement of Facts and Grounds (citing Money v. Leach (1765), 3 Burr 1742 and Wilkes v. 
Wood (1763) Lofft 1). 
 149 Id. at ¶ 35. 
 150 Id. at ¶ 36. 
 151 Id. at ¶ 37. 
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in deeper principles that ought not be abandoned by permissive 
interpretations of statutes.152 In support, it cites several classic common 
law cases antithetical to general warrants.153 Moreover, Privacy 
International relies on Article 8 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights, which states, ―Everyone has the right to respect for his private 
and family life, his home and his correspondence.‖154 The important thing 
about Privacy International‘s claims is that the principles it adduces are 
principles that are part of law (common law cases, the ECHR) which do 
not bear directly on the statutory language at issue in Greennet. Rather, 
the cases and ECHR together establish a legal archetype— a ―provision 
in a system of norms which has a significance going beyond its 
immediate normative content, a significance stemming from the fact that 
it sums up or makes vivid to us the point, purpose, principle, or policy of 
a whole area of law.‖155 The IPT‘s permissive reading of ―specified‖ 
would thus undermine that archetype. 
The second recent case concerns use of Bulk Personal Datasets 
(BPDs) and Bulk Communications Data (BCD) by various security and 
intelligence agencies in the United Kingdom (including GCHQ, MI5, 
and MI6).156 In 2015, the UK government acknowledged that since 2001, 
GCHQ had been collecting and using BCD under section 94 of the 
United Kingdom‘s Telecommunications Act of 1984,157 and MI5 avowed 
section 94 collection and use of BCD.158 In addition, in 2015, those 
agencies, along with MI6, disclosed collection and use of BPD under a 
range of authorities.159 The Investigatory Powers Tribunal determined 
that collection of BCD was consistent with the authority granted in 
Section 94.160 
                                                     
 152 Id. at ¶ 6 (citing Entick v. Carrington (1765) 2 Wilson KB 275, Money v. Leach (1765) 3 Burr 
1742 and Wilkes v. Wood (1763) Lofft 1). 
 153 Id. at ¶ 6 (citing Entick v. Carrington (1765) 2 Wilson KB 275 (establishing that exercise of 
power of public officials to search a house requires specific statutory or common law regime), 
Money v. Leach (1765) 3 Burr 1742 (prohibiting use of general warrants that neither name nor 
describe a person to seize a person), and Wilkes v. Wood (1763) Lofft 1)(prohibiting use of 
general warrant to seize papers)). 
 154 European Convention on Human Rights, art. 8, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 262. 
 155 Waldron, supra note 112, at 1723. 
 156 See generally Privacy International v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs 
[2016] UKIP 15_110 CH (U.K.). 
 157 Id. at ¶ 10. 
 158 Id. 
 159 Id. at ¶¶ 6–7, 13-15. 
 160 Id. at ¶ 58. 
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The IPT also considered whether the BCD and BPD regimes 
were consistent with Article 8 of the ECHR, in particular the requirement 
that ―[t]here shall be no interference by a public authority with the 
exercise of this right [to private and family life] except such as is in 
accordance with the law.‖161 The tribunal based this determination on, 
first, the secrecy of programs, stating ―[I]t seems difficult to conclude 
that the use of BCD was foreseeable by the public when it was not 
explained to parliament.‖162 Second, it pointed to the lack of oversight, 
stating, ―[W]e are not satisfied that, particularly given the fragmented 
nature of the responsibility apparently shared between the 
Commissioners, there can be said to have been an adequate oversight of 
the BCD system.‖163 As such, it concluded that the programs were 
inconsistent with Article 8 at times prior to the government‘s avowal of 
their existence, though consistent with Article 8 after avowal. 
The IPT‘s decision comports with some of Privacy 
International‘s grounds for complaint in the case. In particular, Privacy 
International argued, ―The acquisition, retention and use of a large 
database of information or the use of a national security direction to 
accumulate or intercept personal data plainly amounts to a serious 
interference with the Article 8 right of privacy.‖164 Privacy International 
argues, Article 8‘s requirement that interference with private and family 
life be ―in accordance with the law,‖ means that such interference must 
be ―compatible with the rule of law.‖165 The idea is again similar to that 
of legal archetypes. Specifically, that there are legal principles that are 
part of law, even if not explicitly articulated in statutes and constitutions 
themselves. The requirement that use of statutory provisions (such as 
Section 94) be compatible with rule of law cannot in principle be 
articulated in a statute or constitution because rule of law is a 
precondition for statutes and constitutions to be law. Hence, invoking 
Article 8 to criticize the United Kingdom‘s BCD and BPD programs 
appears to be an appeal to legal archetypes. 
                                                     
 161 European Convention on Human Rights, art. 8, § 2, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 262. 
 162 Privacy International v. Greennet, Ltd. [2016] UKIP 14_85 CH (U.K.), ¶ 70. 
 163 Id. ¶ 80. 
 164 Privacy International, UKIP 15_110 CH, at ¶ 23. 
 165 Id. at ¶ 24 (quoting Gillan v. United Kingdom (2010) 50 EHRR at § 76). 
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V. CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, this paper proposes the most plausible basic 
argument for security-based surveillance. Such surveillance is plausibly 
justifiable where the consequences are positive, where it is not rights 
violating, and where it is not illegal. The bulk metadata program is a hard 
case. It is plausibly legal insofar as it turns on aggressive interpretations 
of statutes and permissive interpretations of relevant Fourth Amendment 
law. The effort to push law so far makes vivid an ambiguity in the ―not 
illegal‖ requirement. I have argued that Waldron‘s conception of legal 
archetypes illustrates that ambiguity. Narrow parsing of legal language in 
some cases may provide a rationale for actions, but if it is done in 
contradiction of legal archetypes it undermines an important facet of law. 
In other words, pushing legal language to its limits may undermine 
principles embodied in law. Where doing so undermines an important 
archetypal facet of law, and makes lesser violations inconsequential, it is 
impermissible. That is not quite a legal issue, and it is not strictly a moral 
issue. Rather, it is both. I have suggested that the metadata program does 
affect a legal archetype, and that surveillance conducted under the USA 
Freedom Act will appear inconsequential as a result. It will be difficult 
for us to discern whether its appearing inconsequential is because it is 
inconsequential or because it appears so in comparison to the bulk 
metadata program. 
Now there are many ways to object to this argument. One is that 
the real argument about surveillance should take place in regards to 
whether programs are effective, or in regards to rights. One might instead 
argue that the real issues lie not in this moral talk, but in the law itself. 
Perhaps it just is the case that the program violates statutes or conflicts 
with the Fourth Amendment, and that addressing legal archetypes is just 
a way to smuggle something into the law that is not there. While those 
are important objections, my task here has been to try to meld them. The 
law does embody values (whether they are good ones or not is always a 
ripe debate), and the fact that it embodies values provides reason to 
respect law. Waldron‘s archetypes are one way to understand that 
relation between law and morality, and in the end I think they are useful 
in thinking through these more difficult questions where legal 
interpretations may conflict with values that a body of law instantiates. 
 
